PRAGOTI

1. We were part of a group of senior nuclear scientists who had in the past expressed our grave concerns and objections to India entering into a nuclear co-operation agreement with the US under the aegis of the Hyde Act 2006. We had written earlier to the Parliamentarians on this matter, and the Prime Minister had given us an opportunity to meet with him and discuss our views.

2. At this critical juncture, when the Government is about to rush the safeguards agreement through the IAEA, there is a great deal of disquiet among the scientific community at large in this country. Should the country be entering into such a long term binding arrangement without a detailed and rigorous examination of the IAEA Safeguards? Should a Government, based at best on a wafer thin majority and a divided Parliament, commit the country in this manner? We, therefore, are strongly of the opinion that the Government should not proceed to seek IAEA Board approval for the current draft safeguards agreement, until its implications are debated more fully within the country, and with a group of experts who were not party to the IAEA negotiations.

3. The government is enthusiastically pushing the Deal on the basis that it will bring about energy security to India, since it will enable the import of foreign nuclear power reactors. But, analysts have convincingly and quantitatively shown that this additional power will come at a much higher cost per unit of electricity compared to conventional coal or hydro power, which India can generate without any foreign imports.

4. Once the Deal is in place, it is also clear that India's commercial nuclear interactions with the US, as well as with any other country, will be firmly controlled from Washington via the stipulations of the Hyde Act 2006 enforced through the stranglehold which the US retains on the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Any argument to the effect that the Deal will be governed only by the bilateral 123 Agreement is untenable, because this Agreement in turn is anchored in US domestic laws, which include the Hyde Act. And, the Hyde Act contains several stipulations which are extraneous to the issue of bilateral nuclear co-operation, including foreign policy behaviour which India needs to adhere to if the Deal is to be kept alive. The real issue facing India, therefore, is whether or not we want this mythical extra 'energy security ' through this Deal, paying two to three times the unit capital cost of conventional power plants, with the additional burden of subjugating the freedom to pursue a foreign policy and indigenous nuclear R&D program of our own.

5. The nuclear Deal could also have other serious repercussions, including a potential weakening of India's nuclear deterrent and an inability to protect & promote indigenous R&D efforts in nuclear technology. A combination of the extreme secrecy with which the government has carried forward this deal, the media hype they were able to generate in its favour, the parochial interests of opportunistic individuals & organizations, and the unfortunate ignorance of the issues involved among the general public have put the country on a dangerous path, likely to lead to the detriment of the current & future generations of Indians. Today's urgency to rush to the IAEA Board, in consonance with the American timetable, to get the safeguards agreement approved and thereafter clinch the Deal during the tenures of the current governments in India and the US must, therefore, be replaced with an openness & introspection that is vital for a serious debate which the situation demands.

6. The central issue about the IAEA safeguards agreement has been the doubt as to how "India-specific" these are. In particular, since it is distinctly clear from the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement that no uninterrupted fuel supplies have been guaranteed in these documents for reactors which India will place under safeguards, the Government had assured that this defect will be corrected in the safeguards agreement. Since the IAEA was all along known to be no fuel-supply guarantor, it is not surprising that Indian negotiators have failed to obtain any assurance in this regard. All that the IAEA Agreement states in its preambular section is that it notes uninterrupted fuel supply and support for a strategic fuel reserve is the basis of placing Indian facilities in safeguards. It places no obligation on the IAEA other than merely noting this. The corrective measures, indicated in the preambular section, have nothing that anchors them to any section in the operative part of the agreement. Against such unspecified and vague mention of corrective measures, India's obligations are clear and binding. In effect, India has agreed to place its facilities that it will list out in the Annex under perpetual safeguards without any link to an uninterrupted fuel supply.

7. The Government is asserting that the IAEA safeguards have "provisions for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India is placing its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity". The nation would like to know clearly what these "corrective measures" are, before plunging headlong into this Deal. India being merely allowed to withdraw the Indian-built civilian PHWRs from safeguards , and that too after stripping them of all spent & fresh fuel and components of foreign origin , is no corrective step at all because such action does not ensure uninterrupted operation of these civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Even here, Article 32 of the Safeguards Agreement appears to stand in the way of any such withdrawal. Besides, this relaxation does not apply to the imported power reactors, which will use up the bulk of our investments in nuclear power; these units will perpetually stay under safeguards, even after fuel supplies are denied. The Hyde Act prohibits the US Administration from directly or indirectly (through the IAEA or other countries) assisting India with life-time fuel supplies after suspension of the Deal. Therefore, the Government owes a clarification to the Parliament and the public about how they intend to avoid the consequential huge economic loss from the non-operation of these extremely costly imported reactors , as a result of fuel denial .

8. The 123 Agreement states that the imports under the Deal "shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and an Additional Protocol, when in force". While the actual draft of the Additional Protocol (AP) applicable to India may have to be negotiated and agreed to at a later date, it is absolutely necessary that a prior agreement between the IAEA and India on the essential features of such an Additional Protocol must be reached simultaneous with the finalization of the safeguards agreement and certainly before signing it. The most intrusive actions under the IAEA safeguards are always taken on the basis of this protocol, including the "pursuit clause" which permits interference with our non-civilian programs on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion. India needs to make it clear what the limits are beyond which we will not entertain any IAEA action or intrusion, and it should be clear that a standard Model Protocol applicable to non-nuclear weapon States will not be acceptable to India. The leverage to debate and get the kind of restricted Additional Protocol we want will be entirely lost once a safeguards agreement alone is first put in place and the installations put under safeguards. As we understand, the limitations within which India is willing to enter into the Additional Protocol regime was neither discussed by Indian negotiators at the IAEA nor do they appear in the safeguards draft or its attachments. In this context , the Government needs to clarify their thinking on the Additional Protocol , before entering into the safeguards agreement .

9. Reprocessing the spent-fuel arising from burning fresh imported fuel in our civilian reactors provides us valuable additional plutonium, which in turn can be recycled into future civilian fast breeder reactors (FBRs) or advanced heavy water reactors (AHWRs). Reprocessing, therefore, is at the core of India's plans to build long-term energy security.

The government had all along pledged to secure an unqualified right to reprocess spent-fuel and even termed India's right to reprocess "non-negotiable". But, in the 123 Agreement, what has finally been obtained is merely an empty theoretical right to reprocess. The actual permission to reprocess will come after years, when a dedicated state-of-the art reprocessing plant is built anew to treat foreign fuel, along with a host of allied facilities. There will be a large number of safeguards & Additional Protocol issues related to this, and all these hurdles will have to be crossed to reach the beginning of reprocessing. Much of the fundamental basis on which all this will be done has to be discussed and settled now at the outset, while the overall safeguards agreement is being finalized. But, the Government has not done this exercise during the recent set of negotiations with the IAEA, and this deficiency will come to haunt India in future unless it is rectified.

10. Similarly , there are many other key safeguards-related issues of crucial importance which have not been addressed in the current draft . Furthermore , none of the issues included presently has been handled adequately or in an acceptable manner. We therefore appeal to the Members of the Lok Sabha to direct the Government not to proceed further with the current safeguards agreement , and ask the Prime Minister to initiate wide-ranging and structured deliberations on the Indo-US Nuclear Co-operation Agreement , both within Parliament and outside , to develop a broad consensus on this Deal among political parties and the general public , before proceeding any further .

SIGNATORIES :

1. Dr.P.K.Iyengar , Former Chairman , Atomic Energy Commission

2. Dr.A. Gopalakrishnan , Former Chairman , Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

3. Dr.A.N. Prasad , Former Director, Bhabha Atomic Research Center

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An appeal to the members of parliament from the Forum of Scientists, Engineers, and Technologists (FOSET) to stop the anti national Nuclear Deal in the parliament.

The Indo-US Nuclear Pact
...
The DEAL doesn’t enable India as Nuclear supplier to others

It is understood that within no time India would be capable to act as a nuclear supplier of Thorium based technology and fuel, in the same way it acted as the best choice for satelite launching. The best part is that the spent fuel under this technology doesn’t have properties for use as charge for atom bombs. So with this technology there is no fear of dual use of fuel (for both civilian and military purpose) and naturally it won’t come under the perview of NPT. Why should India leave such opportunities, which not only boost its own economy and image but also provide the whole world a nuclear power technology free of military use ?

It would have been more wise for Indian Govt. to extract the right of conducting safe nuclear export to others. But there is no effort in this regard from the present UPA Govt.
Neither the 123 text nor the IAEA safeguard text do contain any clause which enables India to export nuclear plant, equipment and fuel. What’s the point in going for a pact which is not useful to harness our potential ?

Let our political leaders be rational and considerate enough not to undermine our own talent and potential.

The DEAL will only increase power cost

The cost of imported nuclear power plants with LWR reactors are much higher – Rs.12.1 crore/MW compared to Rs.8.1 crore/MW for current Indian nuclear plants with PWR reactors and Rs.3.8 crore/MW for Thermal plants. For importing 20,000 MW imported nuclear plant India has to spend Rs.2,40,000 crores in next five years. The Govt. could have jolly well spent only Rs.76,000 crore instead to build the same power generation capacity with thermal power and spend the balance of Rs.1,64,000 crore for imminent social cause like poverty alliviation, public distribution system etc. or for strengthening Thorium nuclear research so that it can quickly switch over to the new economical nuclear power technology after few years.

Moreover with Uranium 238 based Nuclear power technology India has to constantly depend on the Uranium rich nations and big corporate houses turned as NSGs and be at their mercy on supply and price of imported Uranium. These increase the cost of power. At today’s level only the cost of power from the most modern importable Uranium plant comes out to be Rs. 5.5 per unit. The same cost is Rs. 4 per unit with present Indian nuclear plants and Rs. 2.5 per unit with Indian Thermal power plants.

The IAEA safeguards doesn’t provide any price protection. So once the costly Imported Nuclear power plants find their way in India making it compulsorily dependant on Foreign fuel, the suppliers of Uranium 238 would definitely play the tricks to raise the supply price the same way as Petrolium crude suppliers are now doing and the cost of nuclear power will only sky-rocket. Added to that would be increased cost of spares as with the present Uranium technology the core rods and other parts are to be frequently replaced. The same Indian Govt.would then resort to raising up the power tariff in order to compensate the Uranium and spare part hike in a similar fashion it is doing it now for the petro-fuel. This is a price the whole nation would have to pay for deviating from the path of self-reliance.
Let us not sit on myths, but weigh the actual benefits to the citizens of India
The DEAL has no contribution in solving energy crisis

An air is being created that nuclear power is essential and urgent to solve the energy crisis. This is entirely a Myth. The energy need consists of
1. Use as Power, consisting of Coal based thermal, Natural gas based thermal Hydel, Nuclear and Green energy sources like Solar,Wind etc.
2. Use as Fuel, consisting of Coal, Petroleum and Natural Gas.

Out of all these Nuclear power can’t substitute any of the fuel use and out of the power use can effectively substitue only coal based power. Now 70% of power generation is through Coal based plants and only 3% accounts for Nuclear power. As per revised plan of Govt. even with the deal and addition of 40000MW plants the % nuclear power would rise to 8% only, which is practically no substitution at all. India can’t afford to spend more to increase this %. Better substitution would have been possible with the cheaper Thorium technology and huge Thorium reserve (capable of producing 20 times more power than coal reserve).

So entire effort in this deal is misdirected, it serves no purpose in solving energy crisis.
Let our political leaders understand what is right and abstain from misdirected path.

The DEAL is a blatant submission to US hegemony

USA binds India under it’s own act

The 123 Agreement categorically says that it will be implemented in accordance with the national laws of both countries. India does not have a domestic law specific to this agreement, while the US does (Hyde Act). Nowhere does the agreement mention that domestic laws governing the agreement enacted until after a specific time period will be invalid. This point is very important. Domestic laws can be enacted or changed anytime, and yet international agreements are subject to those laws. If India does enact a domestic law that is at variance with the 123 agreement in the future, then it certainly would not be without precedent. The Pressler Amendment made to the Foreign Assistance Act was used by the US to deny military hardware to Pakistan that it had already paid for. There are many other examples of amendments made to US law to deny foreign countries assistance even after an agreement was signed to supply them the same. What is the gurantee that the same won’t be repeated and India won’t be taken for a ride in this case also under some pretext or other or to get politico-commercial leverage?
US aim is to deter the rise of a nuclear India is fulfilled

Fundamentally, the US aim is to deter the rise of a nuclear India. USA had earlier positioned itself to haul India into a fissile-material production ban even before a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty has been negotiated through imposed sanctions. Now that India exhibits its capability to proceed with its own research US is harping on different avnue to deter India. The new bilateral civil nuclear cooperation accord offers a lever of pressure to the US. In any case, once India places orders to import power reactors and locks itself into an external fuel-supply dependency, USA will have the leverage to cut off further Indian fissile-material production. By playing to India's ego and desire for status, the nuclear deal offers an attractive avenue to the US to get a handle on the Indian nuclear program. It is more revealing from the fact that contrary to his solemn pledge in Parliament 'never to accept discrimination', our Prime minister has accepted international inspections on Indian facilities of a type applicable only to non-nuclear states — perpetual and legally immutable.

US compells India to shed it’s own foreign policy and join US bandwagon
The pact leaves levers to USA to influence Indian foreign policy. The supply of nuclear fuel and equipments would be used to force India opting foreign policies dictated by USA contray to its earlier Non-alligned stand, which the predessesors of the ruling party itself built with so much effort.

The whole country is not willing to act as a domestic pet of USA. Let our political heads desist themselves from that temptation...

Let good senses prevail to our people’s representatives to behave as true Patriots irrespective of their political affiliation and thwart the anti-Indian deal.

Please click on the link below for the complete text of the appeal: