Kashmir and the return to "normalcy"

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After nearly three months of a near-intifada like situation, things seem to be returning to "normal" in Kashmir. The question to be asked is what is "normal" in the valley. The answer to that would more or less determine "what is to be done" in the medium term by stake holders - the Indian state, the Kashmiri political actors and broad Kashmiri society. (cartoon courtesy The Hindu newspaper)
 
For the Indian state, "normal" simply means a return to status quo; i.e. a highly "security" oriented valley, where incidents of violence are held to a minimum, protests that can be managed and the administration's writ is restored. For the Kashmiri political actors, depending on where they stand on separatism, "normal" is different. For those actors that have accepted Indian citizenship, "normal" is when they can articulate their politics within the framework of what every other political actor in any other state (province) in India works with. Differences are articulated with the manner the development paradigm plays out and the political elite would want to keep the differences articulated at the rhetorical level  - i.e. the political opposition blames the incompetence of the ruling party in implementing policies, over which both have generally the same opinion. Thus, the National Conference and its supporting Congress would want to function in a violence-free environment, dispensing patronage and working for the "development" of Kashmir, while the Peoples' Democratic Party would want to expose the former's incompetence in maintaining law and order and implementation of the "development" policies. At times that are abnormal, these parties tend to frame positions on the "nationality" question in terms of "autonomy" or "self-rule" - i.e. articulating sovereignty within the framework of the Indian state, but with powers that are larger than the present status quo of Kashmir as a federal unit of India. But again these positions come up and are expedient when the separatists seem to have their stock running high. 
 
For the separatists, again, "normal" is different for different actors. For the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, led by "hardliner" Syed Ali Shah Geelani, "normal" is when the idea of a Islamic state of Kashmir has enough currency and is articulated through the anger of the Kashmiri people alienated with the Indian state. For Geelani, it is only a break from Indian secularism and civic nationalism, that can be construed as a return to "normal". The normal and the ideal for Geelani is a Kashmir that is annexed to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. For others in the Hurriyat Conference and the separatist "mainstream", there are different motivations for separatism and different ideas for a sovereign Kashmir, but the binding element is a Kashmir that breaks from its past - of an unhappy existence within the Indian state, of false promises of autonomy and failures of the Indian state and so on. There is an Islamic element in many of the separatists' articulations, but there is a preponderance of alienation and angst with the Indian state, that is seen to have militated against the interests of "Kashmiriyat". "Normal" for these sections, is when the Indian state is willing to talk to them to listen to their articulations for a newer future for Kashmir. 
 
From the writings of the "ordinary" Kashmiri citizen, from the voices of Kashmiri civil society though, "normal" seems to be a different story altogether. "Normal" is when the Kashmiri citizen is not subjected to repeated and humiliating "security checks" by personnel holding automatic weapons stationed every 50 metres. "Normal" is when the Kashmiri citizen does not feel harassed by "curfewed nights", "encounter killings", and the feeling of being ghettoised. "Normal" is when the Kashmiri youth does not feel repressed and like an alien when she/he goes out of Kashmir for a job like any other youth in India does. "Normal" for the Kashmiri Pandits is when they do not have to stay in camps and come out of their miserable existence as refugees in their own land and "normal" for the Kashmiri trader is when he is allowed to go to Muzaffarabad unhindered to sell/ buy wares. Of course, as some would argue, there are different views for different classes in Kashmiri society over sovereignty, independence, Islamisation/"jihad" and Kashmiriyat. But as the protests show, there is an unifying factor of alienation and anger against the security forces that seems to transcend views on the aforementioned political subjects. In other words, irrespective of class background, age, gender, the protests have seen participation from various sections and reducing it as some experts have done to local grievances articulated by some from particular class background and separatist motivations alone does not seem to capture the story entirely well. 
 
So, the past few months were times, abnormal. The average Kashmiri citizen, particularly its youth vented out their anger at the abnormality by throwing stones at the Indian establishment - its paramilitary stations, its offices and its army locations. The Tehreek and its supporters wanted to keep the anger on and prepare the Kashmiri citizens for a new jihad - not the failed earlier course of militancy, but this new Palestinian like model of protests. No wonder Geelani wants the Kashmiris to continue civil disobedience, not to attend school and keep the "intifada" like situation on. For Geelani, continuing with the abnormal is the way out to prepare Kashmir for his understanding of the "normal". The separatists are not happy with the deaths of protesting Kashmiri youth killed by indiscriminate security forces' firing and want an urgent redressal by the Indian state. 
 
Meanwhile, after months of vacillating and dilly-dallying - the Indian central government's initial assessment was that the violence and stone throwing was motivated and engineered from outside, then they grudgingly accepted that there is a popular anger that requires some response from them and that culminated in the all party delegation's visit followed by some concessions on the hard security approach of the Indian state. But there is still no acceptance of what construes as "normal" for the Kashmiri citizen. There is still no change in attitude on whether or not to amend/ repeal the much reviled Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which is seen to give impunity to the Indian security forces that has made living in Kashmir abnormal for many of its citizens. There is some grudging acceptance of the venality of the Public Security Act and the detentions that it has entailed, and the need to compensate/ address concerns of protestors' families who have lost their dear ones either to security forces' firing or incarceration. But these steps are token and keeping in mind what is "normal" for the Indian state. 
 
It was the same understanding of what was "normal" that drove the Indian state's inaction and maintenance of stasis after Kashmiris voted in the assembly elections. The "overwhelming" response in the elections was construed as a change from the demands for "azaadi"; only it was not so. The participation in elections were an outcome of the Kashmiris' understanding of "normal" - while their alienation and anger was intact, they expected the elections and the outcome to address their other daily concerns. Which did not quite happen. The Indian state's intransigence on their "security approach" and the Kashmiri political class - the ruling parties and the opposition's inability to work toward the Kashmiri perception of "normal" only heightened local grievances and strengthened the claims of the hard jihadis. 
 
Therefore, much more has to be done by the Indian state - again to revisit its hard security approach. Militancy has been more or less defeated and the currency for hard militancy does not exist in Kashmir anymore. And there is no wrong in addressing angst over historical wrong in Kashmir on the question of the "special status" of Kashmir that has been unfairly addressed by the Indian state. That would mean, continuing political negotiations with all sections of Kashmir's polity and trying to find a way to unite a divided Kashmir without losing sovereignty or exacerbating tensions with neighbours. That would entail a revisit to the "soft borders" idea with an open mind, a look at the "special status" through the autonomy framework and enhancing connectivity with the various parts of divided Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian state should show the gumption to do so and not be afraid to transcend and reject the narrow approach articulated by the likes of the Bharatiya Janata Party or the "strategic community" which want a continuation of the "security" status quo and the management of the "Kashmiri problem". 
 
It is impossible to accept that despite whatever currency the idea of a Islamic state of Kashmir holds, the Indian state has to pander to such a demand, as articulated by some liberals in the Indian intelligentsia. Some "liberals" hold the view that the Indian state has expended too much energy on Kashmir and it is better off giving up claims of sovereignty over the region. That is a foolhardy premise, that amounts to giving up the very basis that constitutes the foundation of the Indian republic. One must remember that exploring the middle ground - the grant of linguistic federalism for e.g. made it possible for states like Tamil Nadu to accept Indian nationality without exception, after grievances over linguistic freedom were addressed adequately. It required a tweak to Indian nationalism to make it federally inclusive and grants of linguistic freedoms to make the idea of India more coherent to Tamils for example. It requires a similar exploring of the middle ground on the question of "absolute" sovereignty in a much depressed, divided and historically wronged region. 
 
Progressives vis-a-vis Kashmir should not give up the middle (and the correct) ground of questioning excesses by the Indian security apparatus, the incompetence of the Kashmiri ruling elite, the vacuity of some separatists' proposals on sovereignty and the incongruity and foolishness of the idea of a religious state driven by millenarian ideas. They can still manage to articulate the concerns of the average Kashmiri citizen while doing so. They (we) should demand a grander gesture from the Indian state that goes beyond the token, expedient moves to restore "normality" and push the Indian state's version of "normal" to be closer to what the Kashmiris demand as to be their "normal" state of existence. The steps taken by the Indian left, whose leaders were the first to visit the Kashmiri valley in turmoil and who have articulated bold measures to alter India's security approach, engaged in talks with separatists of all hues and views are in the right direction. Yet the Indian left is a marginal player politically in a politically volatile region. It requires the Indian ruling classes therefore to accede to the demands made by the Indian left, to be responsive to the Kashmiris. And progressives both in Kashmiri society and outside should work towards exploring and working of the middle ground and be consistent to their first principles of secularism, peace and democracy. That is closer to "what needs to be done" from a left, progressive viewpoint than what seems to be articulated elsewhere. 
 

 

 

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Comments

Some Queries

Comrade Srini
I largely agree with the spirit in which this article is written. However, I am left with some queries after reading it fully.
First and foremost, why do you think the left/progressive line should be to follow and explore a middle ground? What is the political basis of arriving at this judgment? Is it just because we need to distinguish ourselves from the inert liberal apologies or the fact that we see Kashmiri independence as a non-option, geo-politically or is it do with the overt 'Islamic' content of the Kashmiri separatism lately?
Second, the now denounced pro-Pakistan separatist elements (like Hurriyat etc.) were till 1980s a well integrated part of the Kashmiri political space. I would not hesitate to say that they were forcibly thrown out from the "mainstream". Indian state behaved like a coloniser for a long time till the 1990s, when people started to protest violently with definite support from Pakistan. But then, when did the Indian state ever allow a genuinely democratic alternative to emerge in Kashmir, right from the time of Sheikh Abdullah? Hence, why not look at the historicity of the state of affairs and the level of alienation on the streets of Srinagar?
Third, this sudden interest in groups across the world which uphold political Islam (varying degree and intensity) like Hamas and Hezbullah is part of the larger Islamophobia after 9/11. Kashmiri struggle, I dare say, like the Palestinian struggle hardly ever had a totalitarian Islamic agenda. It is a very recent development, for which the anti-democratic and security-centred regimes patronised by Delhi are equally responsible.
Finally, Azadi is a genuine sentiment across classes in the valley and it is also contingent, historically as well as politically, upon above factors. It cannot (and should not) be explained away under any circumstance. Be it the discourse of development, normalcy or packages, or limited autonomy, or anything else; it would not be able to contain this sentiment. Only long term political engagement with the largest number of people from the three parties can provide some alternative. But then how do you correct historical wrongs in a retrospective manner? How does one respond to the most widespread sentiment in the valley about the Indian state being an oppressive and militarist set-up bent upon keeping Kashmir at any cost? And we have seen in history, this cost, invariably, has been either democracy or secularism. It has always happened in such situations that the local democratic-progressive-secular forces are defeated, politically, in conflict regions because of the militaristic (and other) adventures of the outsiders (in this case, India).
Hence, how do we deal with the gradual historical disapperance of democratic and secular political forces in Kashmir, actively aided by Indian intervention?

@ Awanish

 Comrade Awanish, 

I have no issues with the questions you raise and the points you make. 

But what actionable step would a progressive and a leftist recommend considering all the history and the present in Kashmir, is the primary question that I wanted to answer in the post. 

I believe that the "middle ground" - the ground that offers solutions anything short of complete independence and kowtowing to sections that demand an Islamic state/ integrated with Pakistan - exists and can be traversed, even if it seems to have been whittled down because of experiences in history. Some steps can be taken in the interim to explore this ground, even when there is the immense baggage of the past. I think these steps will address the concerns that you raise in the queries. For example, "how does one respond to the most widespread sentiment in the valley about the Indian state being an oppressive and militarist set-up bent upon keeping Kashmir at any cost?" can be answered by the step of genuine demilitarisation, steps taken to prosecute those involved in illegal encounter killings, and a change from the hard security approach. 

I would like to know your specific opposition to that middle ground. or do you think that giving up to the maximalist demand for independence is the only way out? If yes, one needs to argue it out thoroughly.

PLEBISCITE

What about the "Left and progressive" comrades take on plebiscite as promised by India. "The Indian Prime Minister J Nehru, accepted this principle and reiterated his position in a letter to the British Prime Minister on 25th October 1947, "our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question of accession in any disputed territory must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people and we adhere to this view" 

Middle Ground and Azadi

Comrade Srini

I would restate that I have no specific issue with the 'middle ground' which has its own value in the short/medium term. I only wanted to know why is Azadi, at least in principle, out of the agenda. Here again, I do not refer to a strict duality between Kashmir as an integral part of India vs. Azadi but want a democratic engagement with all, including the now pro-Pakistan separatists, ensured in any 'new deal' in Kashmir. Relatedly, why do we call it 'middle ground', why not going beyond this duality through some really out of the box solutions and genuine efforts at reconciliation? Is this 'middle ground' the usual CBM in its short run manifestation?

The most precise question would be, do we envisage the remotest possibility of Azadi at all if there is a democratic will behind it, if no why not? If yes, then many things can be done, taking Pakistan on board, pre-1953 arrangement, or as you said making borders irrelevant or else. My other point is: who would be the political actors we talk to? We have already destroyed many independent and democratic-secular parties/forces by either making them politically irrelevant in emerging contradictions in history or branding them Pakistanis. Who are the democratic representatives who would be willing to talk to India and offer something innovative?

My final concern was how do we reconcile the multiple demands for democracy (vs. theocracy), secularism (vs. Islam) and independence (vs. integration) put by divergent actors in India, Pakistan, Kashmir and other international interests, to begin with, at least in the theoretical realm?

 

on "Azadi"

Comrade Awanish, 

I think your problem with the "middle ground" is linguistic. As I said in the post, solutions that are short of absolute sovereignty are possible, provided they are debated out. I don't know if they were ever debated in the chequered history of the past. Incidentally it was Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf that came up with the "soft borders" solution (short of complete independence) and being okay with a concept close to autonomy, giving up on their original position of going ahead with the plebiscite as the starting point. The separatists - the Mirwaiz in particular, from my reading of talks that happened in the mid 2000s were willing to accept this solution as well (Geelani has consistently been intransigent though). I think that the Indian state did not take this up forward as it perceived that it had gained an upper hand in the military battle against militants - militancy has waned since the early 2000s - and the Indian state thought it better to let things as they are, which led to alienation and combined with the 'human rights violations' has continued to fuel the azadi sentiment in the valley. 

So, I think a dialogue with the various political actors can continue to resume. Talks that took place with Pakistan on "soft borders" and movement of material and people across the valley across the LoC can be resumed. All these can be part of the "middle ground" even as the immediate steps to release prisoners, reverse the militarisation steps, prosecution of those guilty of fake encounters, modification of AFSPA, the review of the Public security Act, compensation to victims, perhaps even an employment package and so on can be done within the means of the government. 

I think the middle ground is far more fleshed out and feasible than you deem it to be, from what I gather from your comment. Having said that, the concerns you raise are very valid. 

As regards the last question of nationality which addresses issues of sovereignty, idea of a nation - from the purview of class struggle, that is a larger exercise in itself. To put it rather simply and quickly, my take would be that for the working class and the toiling sections, it is better to articulate concerns in a secular and a democratic state that is responsive to their demands than to work on a theocratic smaller republic based on millenarian ideologies that will take the project of progress much backwards. 

 

Both Srini and Awinash are

Both Srini and Awinash are almost on the same page of the middle ground enunciated by Srini. The questions of how these can be accomplished are the ones which cannot be correctly envisaged and answered in one go.These have to be dealt with, in stages within the framework of the steps to be necessarily adopted immediately, as proposed by the Left. ie making the life of the Kashmiris as normal, as available for any other Indian citizen.The use of the necessary law and order machinery and other measures to control unrest should be as per the normal standards of a modern democracy adopted in other parts of our country.

The example of how the seperate Dravidian State demand in Tamilnadu was dealt with,is a very apt example which can be useful in drawing a road map for addressing the core problem in Kashmir.

Kasim Sait